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Abstract: The exponential spreading and deployment of emerging digital 
technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) has been remarkable: the IoT 
market is expected to triple, at least, from USD 170.57 billion in 2017 to USD 
561.04 billion by 2022. IoT technologies collect, generate and communicate a huge 
amount of different data and metadata, through an increasing number of 
interconnected devices and sensors. Current EU legislation on data protection 
classifies data into personal and non-personal. The paper aims at charting the 
resulting entanglements from an interdisciplinary perspective. The legal analysis, 
integrated with a technical perspective, will address firstly the content of IoT 
communications, i.e. “data”, and the underlying distinction between personal and 
non-personal. Secondly, the focus will shift on the metadata related to 
communications. Through a technical analysis of the highly sensitive nature of 
metadata, even when the content is encrypted, I will argue that metadata are likely 
to undermine even more the ontological and sharp division between personal and 
non-personal data upon which the European legal frameworks for privacy and data 
protection have been built. The incoming ePrivacy Regulation shall provide 
metadata, which should be considered always personal data, the same level of 
protection of “content” data. This interpretation might broaden the scope of 
application of GDPR and the connected obligations and responsibilities of data 
controllers and data processors too much.  
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I. Introduction: The Internet of things as a major source of threat for security, 
privacy and data protection. 
The need of a theoretical premise is justified by the complex interrelationship between 
the concepts of privacy and data protection. Albeit they may often overlap, privacy and 
data protection are rights with different rationales [1–3], as outlined by the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). The classic formulation of the right to privacy follows a general principle of 
non-interference in one’s private sphere. Pagallo, recalling Hanna Arendt, conceives 
privacy, in the digital era, as a movable degree of “opaqueness” [4]. The level of opacity 
that an individual may expect to attain is defined by the rules of the legal system2: public 

1 Corresponding Author, Law, Science and Technology, Rights of Internet of Everything – Horizon 2020 Marie 
Sklodowska-Curie ITN EJD; E-mail: piergiorgio.chiara@uni.lu. 
2 Cfr. ex multis with Floridi [44]: “the “ontological friction” consists in the amount of work and efforts required 
for a certain kind of agent to obtain, filter and/or block information (also, but not only) about other agents in a 
given environment”.  
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interest criteria, defined by law, may ultimately interfere with the right to privacy. Data 
protection, on the other side, has been conceived as a more proactive right3, underpinned 
by the principles of transparency, lawfulness and fairness, according to which personal 
data are collected, processed and therefore used4. 
For the purpose of this paper, it will be assumed that, in order to address privacy and data 
protection concerns raised by the IoT, privacy enablers embedded from the design stage 
of these devices are necessary in order to make these devices trustworthy, safe and 
reliable [5,6]. The need is thus to promote better privacy engineering practices. There is 
a large consensus in considering security 5  and data protection by design closely 
interlinked. Data protection norms seek to address the requirements regarding the 
protection of personal data, which are not only security-related; conversely, security 
settings refer to all types of products, systems and services  [7]6.  
IoT ecosystem is peculiarly designed and constrained when it comes to map cyber-
security vulnerabilities and privacy and data protection threats. Firstly, the problem can 
be framed through an interconnected vertical and horizontal model: IoT has many 
possible applications (also called verticals) that range within a wide spectrum from 
eHealth and smart home scenarios to industrial and smart cities ecosystems. Horizontally, 
one can imagine the combinations of multiple technologies that enable IoT 
functionalities: radio-frequency identification (RFID), wireless sensor networks, cloud 
computing, etc.  
Accordingly, security risks arise: each vertical has specific requirements, often different 
from the others and every part of the chain of all of those technologies needs to be secured, 
which is not a trivial task [8]. There is an urgent necessity of scalable decentralized 
defensive frameworks.  
From a data protection standpoint, another crucial layer of complexity is represented by 
the huge amount of data generated or collected by the numerous sensors equipped on 
smart objects [9]. The scale of Big Data processing takes to a level where risks are 
unforeseen: “the scale is in terms of volume, variety, velocity and veracity, all the V’s of 
the big data definition, and their combination in analytics technologies” [10]. Users’ 
profiles can be easily inferred by the data collections of these data [11–13]. Moreover, 
these huge databases can be correlated thanks to multiple data mining techniques, 
resulting in “a continuous stream of profiles that can be tested and enhanced to better 
service those that ‘use’ them” [12]. Among these techniques, data aggregation is 
particularly relevant for the scope of this paper7. Thus, data from various IoT sources 
need to be grouped together from similar or diverse sources for further processes based 
on a well-defined data model (e.g., physical locations, device types, etc.)8. As stressed 
by the report of Article 29 Data Protection Working Group, “once the data is remotely 

3 Conclusion of the General Advocate Sharpston, Opinion delivered on 17.06.2010 about the joined cases C-
92/09 and C-93/09. 
4 See Article 8(2) of the EU Charter of fundamental rights.  
5  The broad notion of security may be misleading since a proper distinction needs to be done between 
information security and cyber-security. The former underpins the protection of data and information, while 
the latter generally refers to the ability to protect or defend the use of cyber-space form cyber-attacks, 
encompassing therefore a broad range of risks governance. 
6 Enisa has developed a methodology which assists the development of applications in a secure manner, in 
order to decrease the number and severity of IoT vulnerabilities [45]. 
7 Cfr. with Rajagopalan and Varsheney [46] for a specific case-study on wireless sensor networks.  
8 Many authors have begun to reason in terms of “group privacy” and “collective data protection”, since this 
kind of data collection and processing treat groups rather than individuals; cfr. with [47,48].  
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stored, it may be shared with other parties, sometimes without the individual concerned 
being aware of it. In these cases, the further transmission of his/her data is thus imposed 
on the user who cannot prevent it without disabling most of the functionalities of the 
device. As a result of this chain of actions, the IoT can put device manufacturers and 
their commercial partners in a position to build or have access to very detailed user 
profile” [14]. Leaving aside further reflections on consent which fall outside the scope 
of the present investigation, the focus lies in the risks underpinned by users’ profiling 
[15]. Profiling is not illegal per se: recital 48 of the GDPR thus states that data subjects 
should be informed about the existence of profiling (that is, the construction of profiles), 
and the consequences of such profiling (that is, the consequences of applying such 
profiles). On a preliminary basis, it becomes vital to ascertain the nature of data that are 
going to be used to create users’ profiles. A crucial step of a cautious risk-analysis in IoT 
sector should outline whether the data processed are personal or non-personal, in order 
to identify the applicable regulatory framework. 
Finally, from a privacy preserving perspective, IoT systems pose severe concerns when 
it comes to address the confidentiality of communications9. It has been acknowledged by 
the proposal for the adoption of the so-called ePrivacy Regulation, by pointing out at 
recital 15 that the full protection of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of 
communications should apply to the transmission of machine-to-machine 
communications, in order to promote a trusted and secure Internet of Things. 
II. The interrelation between non-personal data and metadata in the context of IoT 
This section will address firstly the content of IoT communications, i.e. “data”, and the 
underlying distinction in personal and non-personal data. Secondly, the focus will shift 
on the metadata accompanying the communications.  
The notion of non-personal data is not clearly defined. Thus, even the European 
Regulation for the free flow of non-personal data provides a negative definition, i.e. “data 
other than personal data as referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679”10. 
Additionally, not only the definition of “personal data” is intentionally designed as 
broadly by the European legislator11, but also the identifiability criterion is dynamic and 
context-dependent, which, similar to “relate to”12, cannot be established in an absolute 
way13. It results that legal certainty is even more difficult to obtain.  
The non-personal nature of such data might encompass a wide spectrum of information: 
machine-generated data and commercial data, whether they have never been personal, 
i.e. data not relating to an identified or identifiable person, or subsequently anonymized 
[16].  
At the dawn age of IoT’s hyper-connection, data reuse and data mining, it will become 
more and more arduous to discern whether a piece of information will not impact the 

9 See recital 15 of the Directive 2002/58/EC: “A communication may include any naming, numbering or 
addressing information provided by the sender of a communication or the user of a connection to carry out the 
communication”. 
10 See article 3(1), EU Regulation 2018/1807 for the free flow of non-personal data. 
11 The ECJ has endorsed this broad understanding of the concept of personal data: it is not necessary that all 
the information allowing the identification of the individual must be in possession of one person (see Judgment 
of 19 October 2016, Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-582/14, paragraph 43).  
12 See article 4(1), EU Regulation 2016/679 
13 See Recital 26 of EU Regulation 2016/679 
P.G. Chiara / The Unsecure Side of (Meta)Data in IoT Systems 107

privacy and the right to data protection of an individual [17]. Furthermore, the possibility 
to single out an individual on the basis of very few data points has become easier [18]. 
This happens mainly due to Big Data analytics techniques [19], that rely upon huge 
datasets composed by personal or non-personal data or, as most often happens, mixed 
datasets combining the two14.  
Threats to privacy and data protection may as well arise from other data processing than 
personal, by combining various allegedly non-personal data to infer information related 
to a person or a group [20,21]. 
Current practices of market operators show the tendency to implement standardized 
procedures for the anonymisation of personal data [22], therefore making them non-
personal15. There is a thriving literature16 nonetheless aiming at implement algorithms in 
order to demonstrate how insecure most of the anonymization techniques could be. 
Organizing, crossing and correlating several datasets with few anonymized personal 
records may result in the emergence of patterns related to single individuals out [23,24].  
In this regard, it is appropriate to consider the case of anonymised statistical data. The 
EDPS analysed the processing of statistical data, which usually consists of two different 
phases: “the initial phase while re-linking the data is still possible, and indeed, desired in 
order to enrich statistical data by linking various datasets17; a later phase when statistical 
data has been prepared, and the keys allowing linking the various datasets can be 
destroyed” [25]. However, the destruction of the keys does not necessarily convert such 
statistical data into non-personal data. Additionally, the EDPS clarifies that the input data 
may be processed in a twofold way: destroyed together with the identification-keys or 
stored as raw data.  As noticed by Graef et al. [26] “even when organisations are only in 
possession of aggregate statistical data and the initial identifiers have been destroyed, 
such data might still be considered personal depending upon whether it has been 
subjected to anonymisation techniques, and whether the latter are considered adequate”18. 
The researches of Sweeney [27] and Narayanan and Shmatikov [28] are two ground-
breaking analysis which might be better illustrate how data aggregation works in practice. 
Among the many merits, the above mentioned examples show how and to what extent 
data inference and re-identification could hamper the individual’s rights to privacy and 
data protection, “for example leading to humiliation or even threat to life due to the 
disclosure of confidential information” [29]. 
Moving forward on the ambiguous and blurred distinction when it comes to categorize 
data, now the investigation considers the other face of the same coin, namely metadata. 
The proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation defines metadata at article 3(c) in a very 
detailed fashion, acknowledging their sensitive nature19: they may expose sensitive 
information and present significant risks [30]. 

14 The mixed dataset, for practical purposes, has been referred “to a situation whereby a dataset contains 
personal data as well as non-personal data and separating the two would either be impossible or considered by 
the controller to be economically inefficient or not technically feasible” [49]. 
15 See Recital 26 of EU Regulation 2016/679 
16 Cfr. ex multis with Ohm [50].  
17 The input data are pseudonymised and, through other technical and organisational measures (complaint with 
article 32 of EU Regulation 2016/679), the risks of re-identification of the individuals are minimised. The 
pseudonymisation process requires key coding the data: the keys, i.e. the information that links the datasets to 
the correct individuals, must be kept separately. 
18 For an in-depth analysis, see Article 29 Working Party on anonymisation techniques [51]. 
19 See Recital 2 of the Proposal for the adoption of the ePrivacy Regulation 
P.G. Chiara / The Unsecure Side of (Meta)Data in IoT Systems108

Recent research shows how metadata may be as sensitive as content, outlining 
individual’s information exposure in IoT environments20, in terms of destinations of 
network traffic. Even if encrypted. The data packets21 communicated (transport layer) 
from the IoT system to the server are sent with so-called timestamps, i.e. the time and 
date of the action delivered by the device: in case of aggregated timestamps, one can 
retrieve timing patterns. Timestamps are metadata: they set the context in which the 
informational object is formed and shared. While data present elements of ambiguity and 
subjective interpretation, context metadata (e.g. timestamps) are more meaningful and 
objective: it is the human experience of the use of informational or physical objects, and 
their interconnection thanks to IoT, the most valuable resource and also the one less 
governable by the end-user [31]. 
In Ren et al. [32], to understand the information exposed during the interaction with an 
IoT device, the research started with collecting network trafficking, and labelling it 
afterwards, when devices are powered on. It resulted that diverse non-first-party 
destinations, e.g. Amazon, Google, Akamai, have received information from the majority 
of the IoT devices under investigation. Researchers then focused on whether devices 
send data securely by analysing the means of encryption adopted. Even though 
unencrypted traffic is a minority of all traffic, substantial information exposure has been 
identified via plaintext traffic for all devices, categories, interactions, and regions. The 
personal data -or even sensitive data- exposed in plaintext was limited. Moreover, the 
authors identified many cases of unexpected behavior, e.g. when a device generates 
network traffic corresponding to an interaction that either did not occur, or it was not 
intended by the user. There were cases of devices surprisingly sending audio or video in 
the uncontrolled experiments, highlighting that concerns about individuals’ data 
exposition by IoT devices is warranted. 
The three aforementioned researches are particularly relevant for this paper since they 
show that even when devices use encryption techniques, the timing patterns of the 
network traffic enable accurate identification of the interactions that caused the network 
traffic. “Put another way, an eavesdropper can reliably learn a user’s interactions with a 
device across a wide range of categories, opening the potential for profiling and other 
privacy-invasive techniques” [32]. Acar et al. introduced a novel multi-stage privacy 
attack: through machine learning approaches, an adversary can automatically detect and 
identify types of devices, their actions, states, and related user activities by passively 
monitoring the wireless traffic of smart home devices. The intrusion works well on both 
encrypted and unencrypted communications, achieving very high accuracy (above 90%). 
To mitigate this privacy concern, they propose a new yet effective mitigation mechanism 
to hide the real activities of the users [33]. 
Similarly, Takbiri et al. investigate the fundamental limits of user privacy when both 
anonymization and obfuscation-based protection mechanisms are applied to users' time 
series of data [34]. 
However, the research of Ren et al. differs from the other two approaches by developing 
a machine learning approach which uniquely considers different possible interaction 
methods between user and device.  

20 Their methodology consisted in 34,586 repeatable experiments on 81 devices in two labs, one in the US at 
North-eastern University’s Mon (IoT)r Lab and one in the UK at Imperial College London, over one month. 
21 Reference is made, here, to the data packets in the transport layer (TCP/IP) within the OSI/ISO model.  
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The three models have demonstrated that illicit profiling as well as privacy and data 
protection concerns arise, in the IoT domain, even when communications’ content is not 
at stake. And even if it is encrypted. Data packets and thus related timestamps, per se, 
should not be considered prima facie personal data since they are the reading of the time-
of-day clock when the structured query language (SQL) statement is executed at the 
application server22. These approaches have valuably demonstrated that an eavesdropper 
might be able to infer, through the recorded timestamp and the patterns they are able to 
create, valuable information regarding the user. Therefore, these patterns shall be 
categorized as personal data even when the underlying communication is encrypted: they 
can nonetheless relate to an individual, and/or the individual can be considered to be 
identified or identifiable [35].  
Dumortier et al. noted that the European Court of Justice’s Tele2 ruling (C-203/15) did 
not argue that metadata was sensitive by definition: “rather, the Court condemned the 
indiscriminate and universal collection of a very broad set of metadata, given that this 
data taken as a whole could establish a profile of the individuals concerned, in the context 
of potentially criminal activity. […] The processing of metadata, even in the context of 
electronic communications, can also have very limited data protection implications” [36]. 
Nevertheless, the above mentioned technical researches have been shown that even when 
GDPR’s appropriate safeguards are established, like means of encryption, metadata have 
considerable privacy and data protection implications. Acknowledging that the ECJ has 
broaden the interpretation of personal data afterwards in the Nowak case (C-434/16) 23, 
the rationale behind this interpretation is in line with the objective reasoning of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Breyer v Germany24: the scope of personal data 
should be determined by assessing whether there are means reasonably likely to be used 
to identify individuals, and not merely a theoretical possibility of identification [37]. In 
our case, the means provided by timing patterns, which allow an adversary to “reliably 
learn a user’s interactions with a device across a wide range of categories” [32], are more 
reasonably likely to be used for identification rather than remaining a theoretical 
possibility.  
This interpretation must deal with two underlying issues. Firstly, it should be noted that 
even though the Breyer case offered the Court a chance “to confirm or reject the WP29 
guideline ‘implied identification = reasonably likely identification’, the Court chose not 
to do so” [38]. The result of the evaluation of what the ECJ considered “identification 
measures reasonably likely to be taken” was elaborated in order to answer the narrow 
question posed, and in relation to the circumstances of the case.  

22 Cfr. with: 
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSFMBX/com.ibm.swg.im.dashdb.sql.ref.doc/doc/r0005886
.html  
23 The Court ruled on the meaning of information relating to a person twice: in the Joint cases C-141/12 and 
C- 372/12 YS and M. and S. v Minister of Immigration, Integration and Asylum (2016) and in the Case C-
434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner (2017). The relation link of the former is interpreted by 
the Court narrowly, as information about an individual, thus rejecting the broader understanding of [36]. The 
ECJ endorsed the AG Sharpston’s Opinion where, at line 56, considers as personal data “only information 
relating to facts about an individual”. In the Novak case, the ECJ overturned this interpretation. Following the 
Opinion of AG Kokott, the Court stated that the notion personal data potentially encompasses any information, 
as long as it relates to the data subject, i.e. when the information is linked to a particular person by reason of 
its content, purpose or effect (Novak case, para 34-35). 
24 If the CJEU had applied the GDPR, rather than the Data Protection Directive, it would almost certainly have 
reached a similar conclusion [52]. 
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Secondly, in considering what means of identification are reasonably likely to be used, 
the Court added the factor of legality to the conditions set out by WP29: ECJ ruled that 
identification would not be reasonably likely if prohibited by law. Purtova, however, 
rightly points out that the Court’s reasoning shall be viewed in a more nuanced way, 
namely that “a legal prohibition to combine data for identification would make the means 
of identification ‘less reasonably likely to be used’, rather than ‘not reasonably 
likely’”[38]. Interestingly enough, another recent research highlights the same privacy-
risk scenario but in a context where timing patterns are publicly available: it shows that 
device identification in blockchain introduces privacy risks as the malicious nodes can 
identify users’ activity pattern by analysing the temporal pattern of their transactions in 
the blockchain [39].   
In conclusion, given that eavesdropping activities, such as sniffing, man-in-the-middle 
attack and spoofing, in relation to the timing patterns are considered contrary to the law25, 
according to the interpretation endorsed by the Court (but contrary to what stated by 
WP29) these means of identification are less reasonably likely to be used, if we accept 
the reasoning of the Court. But, as a matter of fact, they can be used. And the resulting 
inference might lead to illegal profiling and other privacy-invasive techniques. 
I argue therefore that the analysed case-study of IoT systems’ timing patterns calls for a 
necessary reassessment of the abovementioned equation outlined by Article 29 Working 
Party: accordingly, such metadata are reasonably likely to identify. 
III. Conclusion.  
This paper has contributed to show that timestamps related to IoT devices’ encrypted 
data packets can arguably be deemed personal data, even though, prima facie, they fall 
outside any definition of personal data. The case of illegal profiling from adversarial 
inferences of network timing patterns in IoT devices shows that serious privacy and data 
protection concerns may arise even though security techniques such as encryption are 
adopted. 
Therefore, equating every kind of metadata with content, in terms of legal protection 
granted by the incoming ePrivacy Regulation, will be crucial. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that Article 29 Working Party, commenting on the proposal, singles out as a point 
of “grave concern” the different level of protection accorded to content and metadata 
[40].  
The necessary equalisation process might deal with the strong assumption made by 
Purtova, i.e. “if all data has a potential to impact people and is therefore personal, all data 
should trigger some sort of protection against possible negative impacts” [38]. It is 
certainly true that if nearly every aspect of the communication is personal data, and 
therefore data protection regime comes always into play, the “highly intensive and non-
scalable regime of rights and obligations created by the GDPR will not simply be difficult 
but impossible to maintain in a meaningful way” [38]. Notwithstanding, Purtova claims 
that a broad understanding of personal data may still hold on for a while since the hyper-
connectivity of our society has not yet reached a level of maturity such as to justify such 
a paradigm shift.  

25 Cfr. with, inter alia, the Italian Criminal Code: articles 615-bis and 615-ter consider the abusive access to a 
computer or telematic system, or the unlawful interference with individuals’ privacy as criminal offences.  
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However, it may no longer be the case, as testified by the case of IoT devices’ metadata. 
The European Commission released in February 2020 the first pillars of the new digital 
strategy, aiming at creating a single market for data that will ensure Europe’s global 
competitiveness and data sovereignty. In “A European strategy for data”, Brussels 
announces the creation of sector and domain-specific data spaces [41]. These common 
European data spaces will ensure that more data becomes available for use in economy 
and society, while keeping companies and individuals who generate the data under 
control. 
However, the program still heavily relies on a sharp and non-problematic distinction 
between personal and non-personal data [26]. Thus, at the very first point of the appendix 
of the Data strategy document, it is argued that the intention of the Commission is to 
unleash the potential value of using non-personal data in industrial manufacturing, 
whereas “data generated by individuals are concerned, their interests should be fully 
taken into account in such a process and compliance with data protection rules must be 
ensured” [41]. It has been left unclear whether there is a boundary, in such a critical 
domain, in the relatability of data to individuals.  
In this scenario, it is essential to create and consolidate a European data governance 
model26, overcoming the ontological distinction of data, in order to complement and 
support the entire GDPR system. 
IV. Future research. 
Further research should aim at facing up and stimulating the debate on whether encrypted 
data could be deemed personal data or not in the context of IoT systems [42,43].  
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